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The Effect of Mergers on Potential Competition under Economies or 




The merger of two single-product manufacturers into a multi-product firm leads to the 
joint production of two goods which in the pre-merger industry configuration were 
produced separately. Given that, pre-merger, the two firms participate in different 
markets, the merger does not affect the number of firms per market. The merger is 
socially desirable if it does not cause product-specific marginal costs to rise. However, 
if firms are potential rivals, the merger offers them a more profitable but socially 
undesirable alternative. Efficiency gains from such a merger cannot compensate social 
losses from less potential competition.
Key words: Potential competition, economies of scope, cost-complementarity, cost- 
substitutability
I am grateful to Louis Phlips and Stephen Martin for their advice on previous versions. My 
special thanks to Melanie Lund, Aurora Garcia and Stuart Dixon for their help in editing. All 























































































































































































In this paper, I study the case of a merger of two single­
product manufacturers into a multiproduct firm.
In the pre-merger industry configuration, two single-product 
monopolists sell two different goods in two separate markets1. 
Firms produce positive outputs and earn non-negative profits. 
Thereafter, I assume that an exogenous change in the pre-merger 
environment gives single-product firms the possibility to choose 
whether to remain single-product or to become multiproduct. The 
decision of the two firms -or any of the two- to become 
multiproduct would lead the industry along other configurations, 
in which at least one of the two firms would participate in both 
markets. I study the impact of the alternative configurations on 
the decision of firms to merge. Like in the original industry 
configuration, firms are assumed to have positive sales and non­
negative profits.
Higher total quantities produced in each market, under the 
assumption of a negative slope of the demand function, mean lower 
prices and higher levels of social welfare.
Multiproduct firms produce under technologies which are 
described in a multiproduct cost function, while the "stand alone" 
production of each of the two goods implies a single-product cost 
function.
The joint production of the two goods generates economies or 
diseconomies which are implied in the cost function in two 
different ways:
1. The two markets are "separate" in the sense that the two 
goods are neither substitutes nor complements in consumer 
preferences. In terms of location models, the "distance" of the 




























































































1. Economies or diseconomies which affect the marginal costs 
of production due to production complementarity or 
substitutability between the two goods.
2. Fixed economies of scope due to subadditivity of fixed 
costs of joint production as compared to the fixed costs of the
"stand-alone" production of the two goods.
2 3The concepts of synergies matching economies , and4managerial ability , as used in the literature on mergers 
although under various analytical specifications- correspond to 
the concept of cost complementarity used here. The concept of cost 
substitutability refers to the opposite2 345.
The concept of fixed economies of scope coincides with 
Bianco's (1991) "fixed costs sharing" and Baumol's et al. (1982) 
"subadditivity of fixed costs".
Subadditivity of fixed costs together with cost 
complementarity leads to economies of scope over the whole range 
of production, while with cost substitutability, economies of 
scope are achieved only within a certain range of production. In 
either case, joint production is less costly and therefore, more 
efficient than the "stand-alone" production of the two goods. In 
case of joint production of the two goods, higher cost 
complementarity means more efficient production and higher cost 
substitutability means less efficient production. Indeed, at a 
firm's level efficiency is necessarily implied in the relevant 
cost function, since each firm is producing a bundle of goods at
2. Farrell & Sh..|,iro (1991).
3. Dutz (1991).
4. Bianco (1991).
5. In Salinger (1991), these magnitudes are used and modelled in 
a way, very similar to the one adopted here, although the paper 
refers to vertical mergers and the substitutability or 





























































































the production frontier. At the industry level, an industry 
configuration is more efficient if it results in the joint 
production of complementary goods and it is less efficient if it 
results in the joint production of cost substitutes.
Farrell & Shapiro (1990) criticise the rule which is used in 
the literature to estimate the effect of a merger on the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (H). They note that "if all firms 
maintain their pre-merger market shares, the merger will not 
affect neither consumers nor nonparticipant firms, so it will be 
socially desirable if and only if it is privately profitable".They 
use an equilibrium analysis” to derive the post-merger market 
shares and then calculate the effect of the merger on H. Synergies 
are shown to play an important role in the effect that a merger 
will have on social welfare. Furthermore, in their Proposition 2, 
they show that "if a merger generates no synergies, then it causes 
price to rise".
In Section 2, comparing the pre-merger and the post merger 
configurations, I show that Farrell & Shapiro's Proposition does 
not hold if the merger reduces the total number of players but not 
the number of firms per market. According to a common policy 
implication drawn from the literature on mergers,6 7 the proponents 
of a merger should be able to prove that the merger will lead to 
synergies resulting from the combination of their complementary 
productive assets. I show that it is sufficient for the proponents 
of a merger -which does not affect the number of firms per market-
6. See also Salant et al. (1988).
7. "The burden of proof as to cost savings or other offsetting 
efficiencies however, should rest squarely on the proponents of a 
merger, and here I would require a very high standard (of 
proof]." Fischer (1987)
"Efficiencies are easy to promise, yet may be difficult to 




























































































to prove that the goods which they are going to produce jointly, 
are not cost substitutes.
In Section 3, I show that if one of the two firms is in the 
position to choose between multiproduct and single-product 
activity, it will not accept to merge with the other firm. 
Furthermore, the decision of the firm to become multiproduct leads 
to higher levels of social welfare.
If both firms are in the position to choose between single­
product and multiproduct activity, firms are involved in a 
prisoner's dilemma. Simultaneous entry in each other's market 
makes both firms worse off and benefits consumers. However, firms 
may propose a merger in order to avoid the Nash equilibrium of the 
prisoner's dilemma. The anti-competitive character of such a 
merger is very difficult to prove, especially when it leads to 
higher levels of social welfare as compared to the pre-merger 
industry configuration.
As far as methodology is concerned. Section 2 assesses the 
desirability of a merger on the basis of a comparison between the 
pre-merger and the post-merger industry structures. In Section 3, 
I compare the merger to other industry configurations which, under 
certain conditions, may result from the decision of firms to 
start selling in another market instead of merging. The argument 
developed in Section 2 refers to the effect of a merger on actual 
competition, while the argument of Section 3 refers to the effect 
of a merger on potential competition between the proponents of the 
merger. A merger policy based on the approach of Section 3 would 
be less permissive than a policy based on a comparison of pre­





























































































The markets for two goods, 1 and 2, are supplied by firms A 
and B. Depending on whether firms possess the 'know how' for the 
production of one of the two goods or both of them, and, 
consequently, on whether it is profitable for them to become 
multiproduct rather than to remain single-product, each firm may
participate in one of the two markets or in both of them. Firms A
and B are the only decision-making centers. Therefore, I do not 
allow for a potential entry of a new player. Furthermore, I do not
allow for a potential exit of any of the two firms, since I assume
that in all industry configurations, the equilibrium profits of 
both firms are non-negative. In that sense, the industry 
configurations studied here are not necessarily long-run 
equilibrium configurations.
Let q. and q. be the sales of firm i in markets 1 and 2 1 1 1 2
respectively, where i = A, B.
Total quantities in markets 1 and 2 are given respectively by
The inverse demand functions for products 1 and 2 are given 
respectively by
If firm i produces the two products jointly, production costs 
are given by
and




























































































8(5 ) C i i =  F i 2 + 8iq< + 82q,  + 2B / q ; q ;il x 2 i 1 2
If firm i is a single-product manufacturer of product 1, 
production costs are given by
(6) Ci = Fi + 8 iq^ .
If it is a single-product manufacturer of product 2, costs are
(7) C 2 = F2 + 82qi2.
with 8i > 0, 82 > 0, q. > 0, q. > 0, Fi > 0, F2 > 0, Fi 2 > 0 .X 1 1 2
and __ e_ _ _
2 r iqi3
3Ci2/3qi3q 2 denotes cost complementarity (if 6
is negative) or substitutability (if 8 is positive). For marginal 
costs of production to be non-negative, the absolute value of the 
parameter 8 must be small enough to satisfy
— 8/qii/qi2< mini 81 , 82}.
The production of the two products in the same plant may lead 
to savings in the fixed costs of production. That is,
(8 ) F 12< Fi  + F2 .
The profit function for a multiproduct firm i is
(9) ni  = (a-Qi )qii+ (c-QjJq^- Biq^- Szq^- Z b/q^q^ -Fx* .
8 . For a further discussion of the properties of the cost 




























































































The profit function of single-product firm A in market 1 is 
given by
(10) nft = (a - Qi)qft- BiqAi~ Fi , 
and in market 2 by
(11) nQ = (a - Q 2)qBz- B2qB2- Fz .
For simplicity of the algebra, we will assume that 
subadditivity of the fixed costs of the joint production of the 
two products as compared to the fixed costs of the "stand-alone" 
production of each product, will always be of the type
(12) F u  = Fi = F2 = f ,
which is a special case of (8). The implication of this assumption 
is that fixed costs of production are the same for single-product 
and multiproduct firms. This can be the case where the fixed costs 
of production relate to expenditure for salaries of the 
administrative staff, rent and maintenance of the plant and in 
general, factors of production that are not affected by the 
decision of the firm to become multiproduct. Indeed, such a 
decision is more likely to involve sunk costs spent on R&D, a new 
licensing agreement, or the purchase of a new machine. In this 
paper, I ignore the role of sunk costs in the decision of firms to 
become multiproduct or to remain single-product. Any increase in 
the profits of a firm is assumed to provide it with an incentive, 
sufficient to justify any level of sunk costs.





























































































9(13) M = a - Bî = c - 82
In the pre-merger industry configuration, firm A is a 
monopolist in market 1 and firm B is a monopolist in market 2. We 
assume that such a pattern is dictated by the fact that each firm 
is the only possessor of the 'know how' for the production of the 
good that it is actually producing. Let this industry
configuration be Si .
From equations (1) and (2) we get
(14) Q i-<3A i and (15) ° 2=<?b 2
Firms set quantities to maximise their profits, so that
(16) 8nA/3qA = 3[(M-qA()qAi - fl/3qfti = 0 and
(17) 3nB/3qB2= 3((M-qB2)qBz - fl/3qB2 = 0 .
From equations (16) and (17) we derive the quantities that the 
two monopolists produce in equilibrium
(18) qA[ = q02 = Q, = Q 2 = M/2 .
The profits of the two firms are given by
9. For symmetric industry structures -in which each firm 
produces one of the two products or each firm produces both 
products- the implied assumption is that profitability in market 
1 equals profitability in market 2.
For the interpretation of (13) as equality of the sizes of 




























































































Firms earn non-negative profits if 
(20) 0 < f < M z/4 .
2. The Merger of Two Single-Product Monopolists in a Multi- 
Product Firm
Under the assumptions of Section 1, firms cannot shift to 
multiproduct activity unless they reach an agreement for a merger.
I study here the case of a merger of the two single-product 
monopolists into a multiproduct firm. The merger does not affect 
actual competition, since its proponents are not rivals in the 
pre-merger industry structure.
Let the firm that results from the merger of firms A and B be 
denoted by C and the resulting industry configuration by S2 .
Multiproduct technologies are implied in the cost function (5). 
From equation (1) and (2) we get
Firm C sets quantities in markets 1 and 2 to maximise its 
total profits, which, under the symmetry assumption, happens 
together with maximisation of the profits from each market 
separately. Furthermore, equal profitability in the two markets
( 21) and ( 22 )




























































































means that the firm will choose to produce equal quantities of 
each of the two products. This is expressed in
(24) 3nc/3qC[ = M - 2qCi - B/qCj /q^
(25) 3nc/3qCi = M - 2qC2 - B/q^ /qCj
(25) qCl = qc 2
0 ,
0 and
Simultaneous solution of equations (24), (25) and (26) gives the 
following equilibrium quantities
(27) qCl = qc 2 = °> = Q* = - - - i " 6- •
The profits of the multiproduct monopolist are
(28) nc = ^ - § 1- - f .
For firm C to sell positive quantities in the two markets and 
earn non-negative profits, it must hold that 29




























































































2.1. Profitability of the Merger
The two single-product firms will merge if their profits as a 
single multiproduct firm will be higher than the sum of their 
profits before the merger. This holds if nc^s^> nft/Sl+ ^3/5 ,'
that is, when
(31) -f- - 2f < - f .
Given that the merger will take place only if the two firms earn 
higher profits than in their pre-merger form, equation (31) is 
stronger than the restriction given by inequalty (30). Therefore, 
I solve inequality (31), taking into account only the restrictions 
given by (20) and (29).
The merger will take place for all values of the parameters 6 
and f that satisfy (20), (29) and (31) simultaneously. This means 
that parameters B and f must satisfy simultaneously, conditions
(i), (ii) and (iii) or conditions (i), (ii) and (iv), where
(i) 0 < f < Kz/4 ,
(ii) B < M ,
(iii) B < M - /M1 - 2f and (iv) 8 > M + /Kz - 2f
Note that 0<M - /M' - 2f <0.29M, while 1.57M<M +/M* - 2f <2M 
and that inequality (31) holds for B=010.
10. Graphs A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix 2 show the effect of 
an increase of M or a decrease of f on the critical value of B 




























































































Conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) cannot hold simultaneously (note 
that 8 < M and 0< f < M2/4). Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) hold 
for all values of the parameter 8, for which
(32) 8 < M - /M2 - 2f .
I have assumed that f denotes fixed costs of production for 
both multiproduct and single-product manufacturers. As far as the 
merger is concerned, this implies that the fixed costs of 
production for firm C equal the fixed costs of production of each 
of the pre-merger firms A and B. In terms of inequality (32), this 
means that f refers to fixed economies of scope achieved by the 
merger of the two firms.
From inequality (32) we derive Result 1.
Result 1
(i) If two single-product manufacturers of two different 
goods merge into a multiproduct firm and their merger does not 
lead to savings in the fixed costs of production (fixed 
economies of scope equal to zero), the merger will be 
profitable if and only if the two goods are complementary in 
production.
(ii) For every level of fixed economies of scope -other than 
zero- there are positive values of the parameter 8 (production 
substitutability), given by
0 < 8 < M - /M2 - 2f ,
for which the merger of the two single-product manufacturers 






























































































If f = 0, inequality (32) becomes B < 0.
(ii)
If M z/4 > f > 0 then M > /Mz-2f because M2>M2-2f .
Therefore, 0 < B < M - /Mz - 2f defines the positive values of
the parameter B for which the merger will be profitable for 
positive values of f .
Q.E.D.
2.2. Desirability of the Merger
In order to compare two different industry structures in terms 
of their effect on social welfare, I compare the total outputs 
produced. Higher output, under the assumption of a negative slope 
of the demand curve, results in a lower price, which is supposed 
to imply higher levels of social welfare.
The merger will improve social welfare if 
Q i ~ Qz/s1< Qi/sz=Qz/S2 ' which happens if
(33) M M -_B2 2
Inequality (33) holds for all B for which B < 0. If B = 0, 
pre-merger and post-merger quantities are equal and the merger 
does not have any effect on social welfare. The merger will cause 





























































































A merger that generates no synergies (B=0) does not have 
any effect on prices if it does not affect the number of firms 
per market.
If the firm that results from the merger of two single­
product manufacturers produces jointly two production 
complementary goods, the merger causes prices to fall, while 
if it produces production substitutes, the merger causes 
prices to rise.
In the case of additivity of fixed costs of joint production 
(when Fi + F2 = F 12 or f = 0) as compared to the fixed costs of
stand-alone production, an unregulated merger induced by the 
expectation of an increased profit, leads to higher levels of 
social welfare. In that case, a privately profitable merger is 
socially desirable and viceversa.
The fact that if the two products are complementary the total 
market share and the total profits of the merging manufacturers 
increase should not be seen as an increase of market power, but 
rather as an incentive for them to make a decision that leads to 
more efficiency and higher social welfare.
Nevertheless, the two firms may decide to merge and produce 
jointly two cost-substitutable goods. This can happen when 
multiproduct activity leads to savings in the fixed costs of 
production. In that case, the merger is privately profitable but 
not desirable in terms of social welfare. Indeed, according to 
Result 1, if the fixed costs of a multiproduct firm are 
Subadditive with respect to the fixed costs of two single-product 
firms, the merger will be profitable, even if it leads to joint 
production of production-substitutable goods. This will result in 
higher prices, and higher cost of production due to the 
inefficient co-existence of the two products in the same 
production line. Therefore, subadditivity of fixed costs may lead 




























































































which will cause prices to rise and resources to be spent 
inefficiently to cover the excessive costs due to 
substitutability between the two products.
If the interaction of the two products has no effect on the 
unit-costs of production and thereafter on prices (Result 2), a 
decision for a merger which is inspired by the fact that fixed 
costs of joint production are subadditive, leads to a Pareto 
superior outcome. Indeed, it leads to a position where firms are 
better off due to savings in the fixed costs of production and the 
consumers are not worse off since prices do not rise.
In terms of the model presented, the difference between my 
results and those obtained in Farrell & Shapiro is limited to the 
case in which the parameter B takes the value 0. That is, when the 
merger generates no synergies. At a general level, my conclusions 
are analogous to the conlusions reached in the literature.
The argument that a merger increases market power, is not 
relevant to the case studied here. The merger results in a 
reduction of the number of players but the number of firms per 
market is the same before and after the merger, since the pre- 
merger single-product firms participate in different markets. Such 
a merger has no effect whatsoever on actual competition.
I consider a policy maker with "lexicographic preferences" -in 
the sense that he wants first to make sure that the merger will 
not harm social welfare and only then to accept efficiency and the 
resulting increase of profitability as a good argument in favour 
of the proposed merger.
According to Result 2,
the policy maker should consider the merger as socially 
desirable even if it does not generate synergies, provided 
that:





























































































2. The joint production that is going to be undertaken by 
the merged firms does not increase the marginal costs of 
production.
The policy-maker must investigate whether the technologies of 
the joint production of the two products do not cause unit-costs 
of production and, thereafter, prices to rise.
When the two products do not generate synergies, a merger 
which leads to savings due to subadditivity of fixed costs and 
does not increase market power leads to a situation which is 
Pareto-superior to the pre-merger one.
3. The Merger of two Potential Rivals
. In Section 2, each firm was constrained to produce only one 
of the two products. The merger of the two firms could not have 
any impact on potential competition. In this section, I analyse 
the effect of a merger on potential competition.
I assume an exogenous change in the pre-merger environment. 
Firms are not constrained to produce only one of the two products 
each.
3.1. The Proponents of the Merger are Potential Rivals in One 
of the Two Markets
I study first the case in which one of the two firms -firm A- 
is in the position to choose between multiproduct and single­
product activity, while the other -firm B- cannot produce other 
than product 2. Let the industry configuration that results from 
the decision of firm A to become multiproduct be S3. The
configuration that would result if this option were available to 




























































































In S3, equations (1) and (2) become
(35) Qi = qAj and (36) Qz = qftj + q ^
The profit functions of the two firms are expressed 
respectively in
(37) nA = <M-qAi)qAi + ( M - q ^ - » ^ A 2 " «'«A^A,
and
(38) nB = (M-qA 2-qBi)qB2 .
Firm A acts as a monopolist in market 1. Firms A and B act as 
Cournot duopolists in market 2. Therefore, they set quantities to 
maximise their profits taking each other's sales as given. 
Equilibrium in the two markets is simultaneous and this implies 
simultaneous solution of equations
(39) 3nA/3qAi = M - 2qAi - B/q^/q^ = 0
(40) 3nA/3qA2 = M - qB2 - 2qAz - B/q^/q^ = 0




























































































In order to simplify the algebra1*, I assume that in the 
problem of maximisation of the multiproduct firm, the effect of 
product 1 on production costs of product 2 is treated as equal to 
the effect of product 2 on production costs of product 1. This is 
expressed in
< 4 2 > = B 1 2 -
The implication of this assumption is that any difference in the 
optimal output levels of the two products of the multiproduct 
manufacturer will result from differences in the profitability of 
the two markets due to different numbers of firms per market.





( 4 3 ) 0 2 1
q A  2




11. The non-linear functional form of equations (39) and (40) 
yields difficulties both in mathematical operations and in the 
comparison of the results obtained in this section to the other 
results obtained in this paper.
12. This does not mean that firm A will produce equal quantities 
of the two products, since the number of firms in market 1 is not 
equal to the number of firms in market 2 and, in general, firm A 
will tend to sell more in market 1 than in market 2.
When B =0, firm A will sell qAl= M/2 in market 1 and <IBl= M/3
in market 2. In that case, the assumption expressed by equation
(42), does not affect the solution of the system of equations 
(39), (40) and (41). The assumption above, is not very 
restrictive for small values of the parameter B.
In a more general model that would allow for a number of 
firms of each type, the assumption becomes less restrictive for 




























































































Solving (43), I obtain the levels of outputs that firms sell 
in each market. The total quantity sold in market 1 is produced by 
firm A and is given by
(44) qAi = -K-rJL = Ql .
The sales of firm A in market 2 are
(45)
and the sales of firm B are
(46) qBz M + g3
The total quantity of product 2 sold by the two firms is
(47) Q2 =
The profits of firm B are 
,48) nB = i«tfl- - f .
In the calculation of the profits of firm A, I approximate the
13geometric mean of q. and q. with their arithmetic meanft 1 ft 2
Equilibrium profits for firm A are given by 13
13. When 6=0, the arithmetic mean of q. = M/2 and q. = M/3 isft 1 ft 2




























































































(49)  nA = Ltzill + I M = p i I  -  f  .
For firms to have positive sales in each market and earn non­
negative profits, and therefore for the industry configuration S3 
14to be non-trivial , it must hold that
(50) -M < B < M/2 ,
(51) 0 < f < ifcfili +4 9
(52) 0 < f < iM+Bl29
Firm A will become multiproduct if its profits i n  S3 a r e
higher than its profits in Si. This happens if
nA/Sj > or, applying equations (19) and (49), if
(53) ifcja  ♦ - f > - f .
The industry configuration S3 will not be reached if firm A 
does not obtain profits at least as high as in configuration Si. 
Therefore, the condition of profitability of configuration S3 for
firm A (inequality (53)) is stronger than conditions (20) and 
(51). Let -M/2 be an arbitrarily chosen lower bound for the values 
of the parameter B. Inequalities (50) and (52) become 14
14. Note that if any of the firms had zero sales in any of the 
makets or if any of the firms were earning negative profits, and 





























































































■ (50' ) -M/2 < 6 < M/2 and
(52') 0 < f < M z/36 which also satisfies (20).
I solve (53) subject to (50') and (52'). Firm A finds it 
profitable to become multiproduct if
(54) -M/2< S < 0.13M .
Firm B earns lower profits than in Si for all values of the 
parameter B that satisfy (50') and (52'), since
(55) - f < — — ----f for B < M/2.
Finally, considering the sum of quantities of products 1 and 2 
as a measure for social welfare, the decision of firm A to become 
multiproduct will be socially desirable if
(56) JLl_i + 2M_-_i , M 
that is, when
(56') B < 0.2M
From inequalities (54), (55) and (561), I derive the following 
result:
Result 3
If the decision of firm A to enter into the market of
product 2 is profitable, it leads to higher levels of social
welfare.
Following such a decision, firm B, which is the incumbent




























































































We see that firm A may find it profitable to produce jointly two 
production substitutable goods and that the resulting 
configuration will be socially desirable, while firm B will always 
experience losses from the entry of firm A in market 2. In that 
sense. Result 3 implies that private or social losses due to 
inefficiencies resulting from the joint production of two 
production substitutable goods, will be off-set by gains from 
multiproduct activity and the effect of an increase in the number 
of firms per market on social welfare.
3.1.1. Profitability of the Merger
Instead of becoming raultiproduct, firm A could merge with firm 
B. This decision will depend on whether its share of profits in 
firm C is higher than those it can earn as either a single-product 
manufacturer in Si, or a multiproduct manufacturer in S3. I assume
that after the merger, firm A earns half the profits of firm C, 
since its market share and its profits in the pre-merger industry 
configuration are equal to the market share and the profits of its 
potential partner, firm B. Firm A will prefer to merge with firm 
B, rather than to become multiproduct if
,57, i«r6 l i  + _ f  iMrfili _ _f_13'J 4 9  4 2
Solution of (57) gives 58
(58) S > •
Under the assumption that the industry configuration S3 is






























































































If firm A is the single-product manufacturer of product 1 
with the possibility of entering into the market of product 
2, and firm B is the single-product manufacturer of product 2 
without the possibility of producing any other product, firm A 
will never find it profitable to merge with firm B.
Proof;
Firm A will prefer the merger to its pre-merger single-product 
form if
(i) 8 < M - /H‘ - 2f (due to inequality (32) )
and, in order to find it more profitable to merge than to become 
multiproduct, it must hold that
(ii) 8 > (due to inequality (58) ) .
But for all values of 0 < f < M 2/36, it is true that
M - /M2 - 2f <
which means that conditions (i) and (ii) can never hold 
simultaneously. Therefore, for all values of 8 and f for which Si,
S2 and S3 are non-trivial, firm A will prefer to become
multiproduct or to maintain its pre-merger single-product form, 
rather than to merge with firm B. Q.E.D.
Firm B would prefer to merge with firm A than to be a single­




























































































(59) i m±b i!_ _ f < . f/29 4 Z/* ‘
Inequality (59) is satisfied for all values of 0 for which
D „ 26M - B/676M* - 20(5Mi+18f)l bU J p <
However, there are no values of the parameter f from the interval 
[0, MJ/36] that can satisfy the system of inequalities (58) and
(60). Therefore, the merger of the two firms will not take place, 
not only because of unwillingness of firm A, but also because of 
incompatibility of the interests of firms A and B. This does not 
add anything to what we find in Result 4, since the merger has to 
be decided by both firms.
When one of the two firms is in the position to choose between 
multiproduct and single-product activity, the merger of the two 
firms will never take place. This conclusion might be less strict, 
if we had allowed for a negotiation between the two pre-merger 
firms concerning their shares in the profits of the post-merger 
firm C .15 However, it is plausible to assume that firms A and B 
will have equal shares in the profits of firm C, since they earn 
equal profits in their single-product form before the merger.
15. It might be the case that firm A would accept to merge with 
firm B if it were offered more than half of the profits of the 
post-merger firm C, since we have seen that firm B experiences 
losses from the entry of firm A in market 2 (inequality (55) ). 
This would lead our analysis to the study of a bargaining Nash 
solution, in order to determine whether there can be an agreement 





























































































3.1.2. Desirability of the Merger
In Result 3, we have seen that the decision of firm A to 
become multiproduct will be socially desirable if it is privately 
profitable. In Result 4 we have seen that firm A will not find it 
profitable to merge with firm B, if it has the possibility to 
choose between single-product and multiproduct activity. I show 
that a merger would harm social welfare, if one of its proponents 
had the possibility of becoming multiproduct.
Indeed, if the two firms could reach an agreement for a 
merger, the quantity of the two products in the post-merger 
configuration would be lower than the quantity produced in S3.
This is true for all values of the parameter 8, for which 
configuration S3 is non-trivial, since Qi +Q2 >Qi +Q2 or
/h>2 /Sj2— /r>3 /03
(61) M - B >
holds only if 8 £ -M, which would not be compatible with
inequality (50'). Therefore we derive Result 5.
Result 5
If the two single-product firms that merge are potential
rivals in one of the two markets, their merger in a
multiproduct firm will harm social welfare.
If Result 4 holds, the merger of firms A and B will never take 
place. However, I derive Result 5 because it is obtained under 




























































































3.2. The Proponents of the Merger are Potential Rivals in Both 
Markets
I now study the merger of firms A and B under the assumption 
that both of them are in the position to choose between 
multiproduct and single-product activity. Each of the two firms 
possesses the 'know how' for the production of both products. 
Starting from the industry configuration Si, firm A can enter the
market of product 2 and firm B the market of product 1. Firms are 
involved in a game, in which they choose between becoming 
multiproduct (strategy "MOLT") or remaining single-product
(strategy "SINGL" ). If both firms decide to become multiproduct, 
the resulting industry configuration is S*. The outcome of the
game determines,whether configuration S« is reached or not.
In S., , firms A and B behave as Cournot duopolists in the
markets 1 and 2. Each firm sets quantities to maximise its total 
profits, taking the sales of its rival as given. The profit 
function of firm i is given in equation (9). Maximisation of 
profits with respect to each product gives the first order 
conditions
(62) 3ni/3qii= M - q ^ -  2q^- 0/q^/q^ = 0
and
(63) 3ni/3qi2= M - q ^ -  2qij- B/q^Tq^ = 0 ,
where {i, j} = {A, B}.
Given that the industry structure in S« is symmetric (since we
have identical firms, equal sizes of the two markets, and equal 
numbers of firms per market), each firm will produce equal 
quantities of the two goods. Therefore the system of equations 





























































































(62') an./3q- = M - q. - 2q. - 8 = 01 ll ^]1 ^l!
and
(63 ') 3ni/3qi2= M - qj r  2qi; - 8  = 0 ,
where {i, j} = {A, b }. The solution of the system of equations 
(62') and (63') gives us the sales of each firm in each market,
( 64)  q A , = q A 2= q B , = q B 2 = L~i&1 '
Summation of the sales of the two firms per market gives us 
the total quantity produced for each market,
( 65) Q i = Qz = 2iMz81
The profits of each firm are given by
(66) nA = nB = . f
For the industry configuration S., to be non-trivial, firms
must have positive sales and non-negative profits. Therefore, it 
must hold that 6 > -M and f < . Both conditions are
satisfied by the values of the parameters 8 and f that satisfy 
conditions (50') and (52'). Therefore we do not need to impose 
further restrictions on the two parameters.
Firms may decide to become multiproduct or not, according to 
the outcome of "the game of entries". Each firm chooses its 
strategy from the set U = {"SINGL", "MULT"}. The general payoff 






























































































SINGL nA/SJ f' nB/SS” f
Firm A
MULT nA / S j f, nB / Sj f nA / S» f, nB/S, f
According to inequality (54) firms will not have an incentive 
to deviate from ("SINGL", "SINGL") if 8 > 0.13M. In that case the 
configuration Si is the Nash equilibrium of the game.
If 8 < 0.13M, each firm finds it profitable to become
multiproduct. Furthermore, if a firm remains single-product when 
the other firm becomes multiproduct, it earns lower profits, not 
only with respect to the original industry configuration Si (see
inequality (55) ), but also with respect to what it would earn in
S*. Indeed, n_ < n_ holds if B/ S 3 B/S h
which is true if
(67’) 8 < 0.17M .
Given that each firm wants to deviate from ("SINGL", "SINGL") for 
all values of the parameter 8 for which 8 < 0.13M, inequality






























































































I f  f i r m s  A  a n d  B  s e l l  i n  t w o  d i f f e r e n t ,  e q u a l l y  
p r o f i t a b l e  m a r k e t s  a n d  i f  t h e  t w o  f i r m s  a r e  p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  
i n  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  m a r k e t ,  e a c h  f i r m  p r e f e r s  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  b o t h  
m a r k e t s  t o  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  o n l y  o n e  o f  t h e m ,  i f  i t  f i n d s  
c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  o n e  m a r k e t  m o r e  p r o f i t a b l e  t h a n  n o  c o m p e t i t i o n  
a t  a l l .
Therefore, for 8 < 0.13M, the Nash equilibrum of the game is 
("MULT", "MULT").
I compare the profits of the two firms before and after the 
simultaneous entry in each other's market. Firms earn more in S,
than in Si if II. > H . orl/S* i/Si
,68) - f > - f  - f .
Inequality (67) holds for 8 > -0.06M. Therefore, if the two 
products are cost complementary, economies of joint production may 
offset firms' losses from increased competition.
If -0.06M < 8 <0.13M, firms are involved in a prisoner's 
dilemma, since they enter in each other's market and they earn 
lower profits than in Si.
The simultaneous entry of the 
market will lead to higher levels of
Q2/ s , < Q l / s , = Q2/ s ,  o r  
(69)  ,
which holds if 6 < 0.25M. From (68) and (69), I derive R e s u l t  7.
two firms into each other's





























































































(i) There is a range of negative values of the parameter B
(B < -0.06M) for which the decision of the two single-product 
firms to become multiproduct, entering into each other's 
market, leads to a Pareto superior outcome, where both 
consumers and producers are better off.
(ii) There is a range of values of the parameter B -both
negative and positive- (-0.06M< B < 0.13M) for which the
decision of the two single-product firms to become 
multiproduct, entering into each other's market, is socially 
desirable but not privately profitable.
(iii) There is a range of positive values of the parameter B
(0.13M<B < 0.25M) for which the decision of the two firms to 
remain single-product, is privately profitable but not
socially desirable.
(iv) There is a range of positive values of the parameter B 
(0.25M<B) for which the decision of two firms to remain 
3ingle-product, is privately and socially desirable.
The ranges of values of the parameter B, for which Results
7(i)-7(iv) hold, depend on the assumptions of the model.
Nevertheless, the order of the results 7(i)-7(iv) would be the
same for all 8 and f> 0, for which Si, S} and S, are non-trivial
configurations.
3.2.1. Profitability of the Merger
If firms realise that a simultaneous entry in each other's 
market leads to lower profits than their profits in S lf they may
propose a merger as a way to avoid the Nash equilibrium of the 




























































































compare their profits in S2 with the profits that they would earn 
in S . ,. The merger will take place if nc/g2/2 > or
(70) - -§- > 2iM=6lI - f .
Inequality (70) holds for all values of B that satisfy conditions 
(50') and (52'). From inequality (70), I obtain P r o p o s i t i o n  1.
P r o p o s i t i o n  1
I f  t h e  t w o  s i n g l e - p r o d u c t  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  A  a n d  B  a r e  
p o t e n t i a l  e n t r a n t s  i n  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  m a r k e t ,  t h e  m e r g e r  o f  t h e  
t w o  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  i n t o  a  m u l t i p r o d u c t  f i r m  w i l l  a l w a y s  b e  m o r e  
p r o f i t a b l e  t h a n  t h e  e n t r y  o f  e a c h  f i r m  i n  t h e  o t h e r  f i r m ' s  
m a r k e t .
P r o o f :
iiHzgll _  iMzilf _ f _  Q r  9 4 2 °r
(M-B)2 (“|---- ^~) < -§~ holds for all f > 0 . Q.E.D.
From inequality (32), we get that if B < M - /M7 - 2f , the
two firms find it more profitable to merge than to remain single­
product in S i .  From R e s u l t s  7{iii) and 7(iv) we know that if
B>0.13M, firms will remain single-product although they have the 
possibility to enter into each other's market. Then according to 
R e s u l t  8 ,  firms will never decide to merge, if the Nash 





























































































I C  t h e  t w o  s i n g l e - p r o d u c t  f i r m s  A  a n d  B  a r e  p o t e n t i a l  
e n t r a n t s  i n  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  m a r k e t  a n d  t h e  N a s h  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  
" t h e  g a m e  o f  e n t r i e s " ,  w h i c h  d e t e r m i n e s  w h e t h e r  t h e  t w o  f i r m s  
w i l l  b e c o m e  m u l t i p r o d u c t  o r  n o t ,  i s  g i v e n  b y  ( " S I N G L " ,  
" S I N G L " ) ,  t h e n  t h e  t w o  f i r m s  w i l l  n e v e r  f i n d  i t  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  
m e r g e .
P r o o f ;
The Nash equilibrium of the "game of entries" is given by 
("SINGL", "SINGL") if and only if
( i )  S > 0 . 1 3 M  .
Firms will find it more profitable to merge than to remain 
single-product if
(ii) S < M - /M- - 2f .
Conditions (i) and (ii) do not hold simultaneously, since it is 
true that
M - /H' - 2f < 2?J_/4Ml_§i!?lZ362 _ 0.03M< 0.13M





























































































3.2.2. Desirability of the Merger
According to Result 8, if the Nash equilibrium of "the game of 
entries" is ("SINGL", "SINGL"), the merger will not take place. 
According to Result 2, the decision of firms A and B not to merge 
if products 1 and 2 are substitutes in production, is socially 
desirable if it is privately profitable.
The merger of the two firms will never lead to higher levels 
of social welfare if the two firms are potential entrants in each 
other's market and the Nash equilibrium of the "game of entries" 
is ("MULT", "MULT"). In that case, the merger would be socially 
desirable if Qi/g2 = Q 2/s2 > Ql/S, = Qz/S» °r
,7!)
which does not hold for those values of the parameter 3, that 
satisfy inequalities (50') and (52'). Combining inequality (71), 
Result 7, Proposition 1 and Result 8, I obtain Result 9.
Result 9
If two single-product firms A and B are potential 
entrants in each other's market, and if
(i) B < 0,
the decision of the two firms to merge rather than to become 
multiproduct is privately profitable (Proposition 1). In terms 
of social welfare, such a decision leads to a superior outcome 
as compared to the pre-merger industry structure (Result 2), 
but to an inferior outcome as compared to a simultaneous entry 
of the two firms in each other's market (inequality (71) ).
(ii) 0 < B < 0.13M,
the decision of the two firms to merge rather than to become 
multiproduct is privately profitable (Proposition 1). In terms 
of social welfare, the result of such a decision is inferior 




























































































a simultaneous entry of the two firms in each other's market 
(inequality (71) ).
(iii) 0.13M< 8 < 0.25M
the decision of the two firms to maintain their pre-merger, 
single-product form is privately profitable (Result 8). In 
terms of social welfare, the result of such a decision is
inferior to a simultaneous entry of the two firms in each
other's market (inequality (68) ).
(iv) 0.25M< 8,
the decision of the two firms to maintain their pre-merger, 
single-product form is privately profitable (Result 8). In 
terms of social welfare, the result of such a decision is
superior to a simultaneous entry of the two firms in each
other's market (inequality (68) ).
Comparing Result 2 to results 9(i) and 9(ii), we see that if 
the two firms are potential rivals in both markets, there is a 
broader range of values of the parameter 8, for which their 
merger is profitable, than if the two firms were not potential 
rivals. Furthermore, private profitability and social desirability 
are compatible only for some of the values of the parameter 8, for 
which the two firms prefer their single-product, pre-merger form, 
than a merger or a simultaneous entry into each other's market 
(Result 9(iv)).
Therefore, if the proponents of a merger are potential rivals 
in both markets, the merger will never be socially desirable. The 
two firms propose the merger in order to increase their joint 
profits with respect to what they would earn if they decided to 
enter simultaneously in each other's market. The effect of such a 
merger on potential competition and social welfare is always 
negative. However, according to Result 2, if 8 < 0» the merger
leads to higher levels of social welfare as compared to the pre­




























































































that if the policy-maker ignored the fact that the proponents of a 
merger are potential rivals, the merger of the two single-product 
manufacturers into a multi-product firm would be regarded as an 
improvement of social welfare.
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Two single-product producers of two different products are the 
only potential entrants in each other's market. The two markets 
are of equal sizes. Firms, in all configurations that result from 
the decision of one or both of them to enter into the other firm's 
market, have positive sales and earn non-negative profits. Under 
these assumptions, I have studied the effect of a merger on 
potential competition and on social welfare.
In the pre-merger industry structure the two single-product 
firms sell in two different markets. The merger of the two single­
product manufacturers into one multiproduct firm reduces the 
number of players but not the number of firms per market.
In Section 2, the two firms do not have the possibility to 
choose between single-product and multiproduct activity. 
Therefore, the merger of the two firms does not affect potential 
competition.
With respect to the literature that deals with the trade off 
between efficiency and competition, following a merger, Result 2 
calls for a less strict merger policy than what Farrel & Shapiro 
(1990) suggests, since a merger which generates no synergies can 
be socially desirable, if it does not affect the number of firms 
per market and does not cause marginal costs of production to 
rise.
According to Result 1, if the fixed costs of the multiproduct 
cost function are subadditive with respect to the fixed costs of 




























































































two production substitutes may find it profitable to merge into a 
multiproduct firm. We have seen in Result 2 that this would lead 
to lower levels of social welfare. Therefore, I obtain a positive 
answer to the question whether a merger policy is necessary or 
not.
In Section 3, the proponents of the merger are potential 
rivals in one of the two markets or in both of them.
The merger of the two firms will always lead to lower levels 
of social welfare than the decision of one of the two firms or 
both of them to enter into the other firm's market. According to 
Result 4, a merger will not take place if there is only one firm 
that can choose between multiproduct and single-product activity 
and that firm is offered half the profits of the post-merger 
multiproduct firm. However, we see in Results 5, 8, 9 and in 
Proposition 1 that a merger between potential rivals will never be 
socially desirable if it is privately profitable. If two firms are 
potential rivals, they propose a merger in order to increase their 
joint profits1®. Such a merger should be regarded as the result of 
the anti-competitive behaviour of its proponents as
In Bael & Beilis (1990) it is argued that "not every merger 
effected by a company holding a dominant position is to be 
regarded as an abuse". It is suggested that the policy maker, 
should take into account the effect of the merger on actual and 
potential competition and the resulting advantages of consumers 
from technical progress. The "case-handler" should have the right 
to carry out any kind of investigation and firms should pay heavy 
fines if they provide misleading information.
16. This, following Phlips (1988), is equivalent to an agreement 




























































































We have seen that if the merger of two single-product 
manufacturers into a single-product firm leads to joint production 
of cost-complementary products, marginal costs of production fall 
and consumers are better off. However, consumer's advantage from 
technical progress is offset by losses due to the negative effect 
of the merger on potential competition. If the proponents of a 
merger are potential competitors, the merger is not socially 
desirable even if it promises efficiencies.
The policy implications drawn refer to industries in which 
multi-product activity is subject to availability of the "know­
how" for the production of more than one product and to the 
decision of manufacturers to enter in other markets. Therefore, 
the policy-maker should investigate whether the proponents of a 
merger could become multi-product instead of merging into a multi­
product firm. The importance of any information on whether the 





























































































D i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  i n  ( 5 )
In Figure A1 we see the shape of the multiproduct cost 
function given by equation (5).
Let a number k>0 denote a ray of expansion of the production 
of the two goods, along which the ratio of outputs of goods 1 and 
2 is constant, so that k=q^ /q^ . Along any ray of expansion, the
multiproduct cost function (5) behaves as a single-product cost 
function with constant marginal costs. Indeed if we substitute q^
in (5) with kq. , we get
1 2
C i 2 =  Fi  2 + B i k q . '+ B 2 q ; + 2 8/ k q f  o ri. 2 A 2 -L 2
(1.1) C l2= F 12 + (Bik+ 82+ 2 B/k )qiz ,
the marginal cost of this linear function is non-negative if
(1.2) B1 k+ B2 > 2 B/k .
For marginal product-specific costs to be non-negative at any 
point (q. ,q. ) of the plane q. Oq. , it must hold that11 0 12 0 l l l 2
3C1 2/3q, = Bi + B/q"j > 0 and11 12 0 11 0 —
3C i2/3<Ij = 82 + B/q^ /q, ~ > 01 2 11 0 1 2 0




























































































(1.3) -B < rain{Bi/q^ 7q7 » Bz/cT /q, } .
— 1 1 0 1 Z 0 1 2 0 1 I 0
Conditions (1.2) and (1.3) do not require any restrictions on 
the parameter 6, if B > 0. If B <' 0, then for every ray of 
expansion k0, the absolute value of B should be sufficiently small
to satisfy (1.2) and (1.3). The two conditions become more
restrictive for those points (q^ , ) that are very close to the
axes 0q. or 0q. and the absolute value of B must be restricted 1 1 1 2
to be very low.
Tor points that lie near the ray defined by k=l, or if
q^ =>q̂  , conditions (1.2) and (1.3) are satisfied if
(1.4) -B < min{Bi - 82} •
Under this assumption, the geometric mean of the two outputs 
given by /q, q. can be approximated by the arithmetic mean given
by (q^+qi )/2. Furthermore the effect of each product on the
marginal cost of the other can be approximated by the parameter B 
alone.
This property makes the cost function given by (5) a useful 



























































































































































































T h e  G r a p h i c a l  S o l u t i o n  o f  I n e q u a l i t y  ( 3 1 )
In Figures A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3 we see that the critical value 
of the parameter B below which the merger will take place depends 
on the values of M and of f.
When
(2.1) Bz+2f-2BM > 0
inequality (31) is satisfied and the merger is profitable.
I plot the first part of (2.1) for M=10, f=20 in the interval 
(-2, 10) for the values of the parameter B (Fig. A2.1). I plot the 
same function for a higher value of M (M=15 - Fig. A2.2) and for a 
lower value of f (f=15 - Fig. A2.3). We observe that in both cases 
the critical value of the parameter 8 below which the merger will 
take place, decreases. In other words, if the merger achieves low 
savings in the fixed costs of production, or pofitability from 
each market is high, the firms will tolerate less inefficiency 
that results from the joint production of two substitutable 
products.
A further remark is that in the interval of values that are 
permitted for the parameter B, there is only one root for the 
quadratic expression (2.1) and consequently an upper bound for the 




























































































Figure A2: 8z+2f-28M > 0. The critical value of the 
parameter B below which the merger takes place, decreases for 
lower savings in the fixed costs of production, or for higher 
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